This paper analyzes the e¤ects of monetary shocks in a DSGE model that allows for a general form of smoothly state-dependent pricing by …rms. As in Dotsey, King, and Wolman (1999) and Caballero and Engel (2007) , our setup is based on one fundamental property: …rms are more likely to adjust their prices when doing so is more valuable. The exogenous timing (Calvo 1983) and …xed menu cost (Golosov and Lucas 2007) models are nested as limiting cases of our setup.
Introduction

1
Sticky prices are an important ingredient in modern dynamic general equilibrium models, including those used by central banks for policy analysis. But how exactly to model price stickiness remains just as controversial as ever. The Calvo (1983) model's …xed probability of adjustment is popular for its analytical tractability, but lacks the theoretical appeal of a microfounded framework immune to the Lucas critique. In an in ‡uential article, Golosov and Lucas (2007) studied a model of price stickiness microfounded on the basis of …xed "menu costs". They calibrated their model to match certain moments of the distribution of price changes in US microdata, and found only small and transitory real e¤ects of monetary shocks. The implication is that the larger real e¤ects found under the Calvo setup are exaggerated and therefore misleading for policy purposes.
In this paper, we calibrate and simulate a general model of smoothly state-dependent pricing by …rms that nests a variety of in ‡uential pricing models. As in Dotsey, King, and Wolman (1999) and Caballero and Engel (2007) , our setup rests on one fundamental property: …rms are more likely to adjust their prices when doing so is more valuable. The Calvo and …xed menu cost models are nested as two opposite limiting special cases of our framework. We calibrate our model to match the distribution of price adjustments found in recent US microdata (Klenow and Kryvstov 2008; Midrigan 2008; Nakamura and Steinsson 2007) , and in doing so we estimate a parameter that controls the degree of state dependence of pricing behavior. Unlike Golosov and Lucas (2007) , our calibration is consistent with the fact that small price changes are common in the data, alongside frequent large price adjustments (Midrigan 2008 ). 2 Our impulse response analysis shows that increased money growth causes a persistent rise in both in ‡ation and output, with real e¤ects only slightly weaker than those in the Calvo model. We show how to decompose the impulse response of in ‡ation into three parts: the intensive margin (driven by changes in the average desired price adjustment), the extensive margin (driven by changes in the fraction of …rms adjusting), and the selection e¤ect (driven by changes in which …rms adjust). Under our baseline parameterization, about two-thirds of the in ‡ation response to a money supply shock comes from the intensive margin, and most of the rest from the selection e¤ect. Golosov and Lucas'(2007) …nding that uncorrelated money growth shocks have only a small and transitory e¤ect on output derives from the strong selection e¤ect their model generates. But we …nd that their speci…cation exaggerates the selection e¤ect because it implies a degree of state dependence inconsistent with microdata. In particular, extreme state dependence is the same property that generates a sharply bimodal distribution of price adjustments, which is why our estimate prefers milder state dependence.
Whereas Golosov and Lucas restrict attention to iid money growth shocks, we also study the autocorrelated case. In all versions of the model, including the …xed menu cost speci…cation, making money shocks autocorrelated substantially increases their real e¤ects. However, the shape and persistence of the response is primarily determined by the degree of state dependence, not by the degree of autocorrelation of the driving process. Thus we …nd large di¤erences in behavior between our calibrated model and a …xed menu cost speci…cation, but little di¤erence between the impact of autocorrelated and uncorrelated money shocks, except for a rescaling.
As many authors have emphasized, matching microdata on price adjustments makes it essential to allow for …rm-speci…c shocks, and the presence of these shocks potentially changes the stickiness of prices. Idiosyncratic shocks have other quantitatively important implications too: in particular, we …nd they imply that changes in price dispersion have a …rst-order impact on productivity. But obviously, including …rm-speci…c shocks complicates the analysis, because it implies a heterogeneous agent problem in which the entire distribution of prices and productivities across …rms becomes a state variable. Methodologically, our main contribution is to show how to characterize the general equilibrium dynamics using the algorithm of Reiter (2008) . This method is well suited for problems in which idiosyncratic shocks matter more to the individual decision maker than aggregate shocks do, because it is fully nonlinear in idiosyncratic factors even though it imposes linearity in aggregate factors. Moreover, it is easy to implement because each step in the calculation is a familiar numerical procedure. First, it involves calculating the steady state equilibrium, which means solving a backwards induction problem on a grid repeatedly until a …xed point for the aggregate price level is found. Second, the aggregate dynamics are solved linearly, which can be done with standard methods (e.g. Klein 2000; Sims 2001 ) in spite of the fact that this involves a very large system of equations representing values and densities at all points on the grid.
Related literature
Few prior studies on state-dependent pricing have attempted to calculate a dynamic general equilibrium with …rm-speci…c shocks. Instead, much research on how state-dependent pricing aggregates has looked at partial equilibrium models, as in Engel (1993, 2007) and Klenow and Kryvstov (2008) . Some papers have demonstrated surprising aggregation properties implied by special idiosyncratic shock processes, including Caplin and Spulber (1987) , Caplin and Leahy (1997) , Gertler and Leahy (2005) , and Damjanovic and Nolan (2005) . An important step forward to a more standard general equilibrium framework for state-dependent pricing was taken by Dotsey, King, and Wolman (1999) . But their solution method relied on reducing the dimensionality of the aggregate state by ignoring idiosyncratic shocks, so that all …rms that adjust at a given point in time choose the same price. While heterogeneity may average out in many macroeconomic contexts, it is not so easily ignored in the debate over price stickiness, because …rm-level shocks could be crucial for …rms'incentives to adjust prices. This makes it hard to draw unambiguous conclusions about the importance of state-dependent pricing from the Dotsey et al. (1999) setup. Golosov and Lucas (2007) were the …rst to confront these issues head on, studying a menu cost model in general equilibrium with idiosyncratic productivity shocks, and they obtained a striking near-neutrality result. There is some debate between Golosov and Lucas (2007) and Midrigan (2008) on one hand, and Caballero and Engel (2007) on the other, as to whether this result is caused by selection e¤ects; we provide a quantitative de…nition of the selection component which does, in fact, prove to be the main factor explaining monetary near-neutrality in Golosov and Lucas'setup. We also extend Golosov and Lucas'work by comparing iid and autocorrelated money growth shocks. Moreover, our solution method avoids making the assumption of constant consumption that their solution required. While this assumption was roughly valid for the case they considered, we show that it is violated under more general forms of state-dependent pricing and under autocorrelated money growth shocks.
Several recent papers, like our own, have remarked that Golosov and Lucas'model generates a counterfactual distribution of price adjustments in which small changes never occur. They have proposed some more complex pricing models to …x this problem, including sectoral heterogeneity in menu costs (Klenow and Kryvstov, 2008 ), 3 multiple products on the same "menu" combined with leptokurtic technology shocks (Midrigan, 2008) , a mix of ‡exible-and sticky-price …rms together with a mix of two distributions of productivity shocks (Dotsey, King, and Wolman, 2008) . While the latter two models are quite successful at matching the distribution of price changes, we propose a much simpler approach: we just allow the probability of price adjustment to increase smoothly with the value of adjustment (in contrast with the discontinuous jump in probability that occurs in a …xed menu cost model). Implementing this approach requires us to impose some smooth family of functions to represent the adjustment probability, and estimate its parameters. There are just three free parameters in the family of functions we choose, but our success in reproducing the distribution of price changes is similar to that of the aforementioned papers. 4 Like us, Dotsey, King, and Wolman (2008) and Midrigan (2008) calculate general equilibrium dynamics. Dotsey et al. (2008) build on their earlier (1999) model with identical …rms by adding …rst two possible idiosyncratic states, then as many as …ve. They …nd that the non-monotonic impulse responses ("echo e¤ects") observed in their original model disappear as additional microstates are included. Their computational approach is complicated by the need to keep track of how many …rms changed prices at each prior point in time and in each possible idiosyncratic state. Midrigan (2008) instead computes general equilibrium dynamics by the method of Krusell and Smith (1998) . This method has several disadvantages. First, it requires a guess about which moments of the distribution will best summarize shifts in the value function, which may not be obvious. 5 Second, one must verify the guess numerically by solving Krusell and Smith's …xed-point problem (mutual consistency between the value function and the law of motion). Third, the inaction region in …xed menu cost models implies that money supply shocks could have substantially di¤erent e¤ects starting from di¤erent distributions that share the same mean, which calls into question the approximate aggregation property that underpins the Krusell and Smith method.
Reiter's (2008) method provides a more straightforward way of tackling the distributional dynamics of a state-dependent pricing model. In contrast to Dotsey et al. (2008) , it more fully exploits the recursive structure of the model, simply keeping track of the distribution of prices and productivities, with no need to know who adjusted when. In contrast to Krusell and Smith (1998) , there is no need to search for an adequate summary statistic for the distribution. In contrast to Den Haan (1997) , there is no need to impose a speci…c functional form on the distribution. We hope to convince the reader that by combining a standard backward-induction problem with a standard linearization of the dynamics, Reiter's method allows us to characterize distributional dynamics in a way that is transparent to write down and straightforward to program, yet provides a thorough recursive description of general equilibrium. At the same time, we show that none of the complications Dotsey et al. and Midrigan tack on to the …xed menu cost framework are crucial for their most important …nding. Simply smoothing out individual decisions su¢ ces to reproduce the distribution of price changes, and leads to a calibration with substantial monetary non-neutrality. As in Dotsey et al. (2008) and Midrigan (2008) , the 3 Damjanovic and Nolan (2005) also study sectoral heterogeneity in menu costs, but they focus on explaining di¤erences in frequency and timing of adjustment across sectors, whereas Klenow and Kryvstov (2008) , like us, attempt to reproduce the distribution of price adjustments. 4 Our model also behaves well in the face of large changes in the steady state in ‡ation rate: see our companion paper, Costain and Nakov (2008) . 5 Midrigan's summary statistic is the cross-sectional mean of the product of the lagged price with current productivity.
e¤ects of money growth shocks in our model resemble those of the Calvo framework much more than those found under …xed menu costs.
Partial equilibrium: the …rm' s problem
We begin by explaining how we model price stickiness. For this purpose, it su¢ ces to study the partial equilibrium problem of a monopolistically competitive …rm. Later we will show how our …rm's problem …ts into an otherwise-standard dynamic stochastic general equilibrium. Klenow and Kryvstov (2008) and Golosov and Lucas (2007) have argued convincingly that …rms often su¤er large idiosyncratic shocks. Thus, if they are fully rational, fully informed, and capable of frictionless adjustment, …rms will adjust their prices every time a new shock is realized. We instead assume prices are "sticky", in a well-de…ned sense: the probability of adjusting is less than one, but is greater when the bene…t from adjusting is greater. The adjustment bene…t is calculated from the …rm's Bellman equation: there is a value associated with optimally choosing a new price today (while bearing in mind that prices will not always be adjusted in the future); likewise there is a value associated with leaving the current price unchanged today (likewise bearing in mind that prices will not always be adjusted in the future). The di¤erence between these two is the adjustment bene…t (or the loss from failing to adjust). The function (L) that gives the adjustment probability in terms of the loss L from failing to adjust is taken as a primitive of the model. We will choose a speci…cation for that makes it easy to nest di¤erent models by appropriately setting a few parameters.
There are at least two ways of interpreting this framework. It could be seen as a model of stochastic menu costs, as in Dotsey, King, and Wolman (1999) or Caballero and Engel (1999) . If rational, fully-informed …rms draw an iid adjustment cost x every period, with cumulative distribution function (x), then they will adjust their behavior whenever the adjustment cost x is less than or equal to the loss L from failing to adjust. Therefore, their probability of adjustment is (L) when the loss from nonadjustment is L.
But perhaps this is an unnecessarily literal interpretation of the model. Alternatively, as in Akerlof and Yellen (1985) , "stickiness" can be seen as a minimal deviation from rational expectations behavior, in which …rms sometimes fail to react to changed conditions if the cost of such errors is small. Perhaps failure to adjust occurs because information itself is "sticky" (as in Reis, 2006) ; or perhaps because managers face information processing constraints (as in Woodford 2008); rather than taking a stand on this, we just regard our assumption as an axiom to be imposed on near-rational, near-full-information behavior. Our framework stays close to full rationality both because we can choose a function that is close to one for most L, and more importantly because large mistakes are less likely than trivial ones, allowing us to deviate smoothly from the standard rational case to nest and compare other nearby forms of behavior.
The monopolistic competitor' s decision
Suppose then, following Golosov and Lucas (2007) , that each …rm i produces output Y it under a constant returns technology, with labor N it as the only input, and faces an idiosyncratic productivity process A it :
Firms are monopolistic competitors, facing the demand curve Y it = # t P it , where # t represents aggregate demand, and we assume they ful…ll all demand at the price they set. They hire in competitive labor markets at wage rate W t , so per-period pro…ts are
We call the aggregate state of the economy t . There is no need to specify the structure of t yet, except to say that it is a Markov process which determines the aggregate endogenous variables:
Idiosyncratic productivity A it is driven by an unchanging Markov process, iid across …rms and unrelated to distinguish between shocks to demand and productivity both at the …rm and at the aggregate level for greater quantitative realism, but for our current purpose of investigating the relevance of state dependence for price stickiness this seems unimportant.
To implement our assumption that adjustment is more likely when it is more valuable, we must de…ne the values of adjustment and nonadjustment. If a …rm fails to adjust (so that P it = P it 1 ), then its current pro…ts and its future prospects will both depend on its productivity A it and on its price P it . Therefore these both enter as state variables in the value function of a nonadjusting …rm, V (P it ; A it ; t ), which also depends on the aggregate state of the economy. When a …rm adjusts, we assume it chooses the best price conditional on its current productivity shock and on the aggregate state. Therefore, the value function of an adjusting …rm, after netting out any costs that may be required to make the adjustment, is just V (A it ; t ) max P 0 V (P 0 ; A it ; t ). The value of adjusting to the optimal price, written in the same units as the value function, is then
Of course, we don't want the adjustment probability to di¤er when values are denominated in euros instead of pesetas. In order to take the function that maps the value of adjusting into the probability of adjusting as a primitive of the model, we must be sure to write it in the appropriate units. Under either interpretation of the model, the most natural units are those of labor time. Under the stochastic menu cost interpretation, the labor e¤ort of changing price tags or rewriting the menu is likely to be a large component of the cost. Under the bounded rationality interpretation, even though we don't explicitly model the computation process, we suppose the adjustment probability is related to the labor e¤ort associated with obtaining new information and/or recomputing the optimal price. 6 Therefore, the function should depend on the loss from failing to adjust, converted into units of labor time by dividing by the wage rate. That is, the probability of adjustment is (L (P it ; A it ; t )), where
and is a given weakly increasing function which we take as a primitive of the model.
For clarity, we will distinguish between the …rm's beginning-of-period price, e P it P it 1 , and the price at which it produces and sells at time t, P it , which may or may not di¤er from e P it . Adjustments occurs with state-dependent probability :
P (A it ; t ) arg max P 0 V (P 0 ; A it ; t ) with probability D( e Pit;Ait; t) W ( t) e P it P i;t 1 with probability 1
The function must satisfy 0 0. In particular, we will consider the class
with and positive, and 2 [0; 1]. This function equals when L = , and is concave for 1 and S-shaped for > 1. It has fatter tails than the normal cdf, which may help it match the fat tails of the observed adjustment distribution emphasized by Midrigan (2008) .
Note that the parameter can be interpreted as controlling the degree of state dependence. The value of adjustment, L, is the summary statistic relevant for determining whether or not a …rm should adjust. In the limit = 0, our model nests that of Calvo (1983) , with (L) = , so that literally speaking the adjustment probability is independent of the relevant state. At the opposite extreme, our setup nests a …xed menu cost model. Taking the limit as ! 1, (L) becomes the indicator function 1 fL g, which has value 1 whenever L and is zero otherwise. This has very strong state dependence, in the sense that the adjustment probability jumps from 0 to 1 when the state L passes threshold . Under all intermediate values of , the probability increases smoothly as a function of the state L. In this sense, choosing to match microdata means determining what degree of state dependence is most consistent with observed …rm behavior.
We are now ready to write the Bellman equation that de…nes the value of producing at any given price. It di¤ers somewhat depending on whether we impose the stochastic menu cost interpretation of our model or the bounded rationality interpretation; we begin with the latter because it is slightly simpler. Given the …rm's price P and its productivity shock A, current pro…ts are P W ( ) A #( )P . The …rm anticipates adjusting or not adjusting in the next period depending on the bene…ts of adjusting at that time. Therefore, using primes to denote next period's values, the Bellman equation is:
o where Q ( ; 0 ) is the …rm's stochastic discount factor and the expectation refers to the distribution of A 0 and 0 conditional on A and . Note that on the left-hand side of the Bellman equation, and in the term that represents current pro…ts, P refers to a given …rm i's price P it at the time of production. In the expectation on the right, P represents the price e P i;t+1 at the beginning of period t + 1, which may (probability ) or may not (probability 1 ) be adjusted prior to time t + 1 production. Making the rearrangement (1 ) V + max V = V + (max V V ) allows us to simplify the Bellman equation substantially on the right-hand side. We notice that the terms inside the expectation represent the value of continuing without adjustment, plus the ‡ow of gains due to adjustment. The Bellman equation becomes: Bellman equation in partial equilibrium, with aggregate shocks:
where
represents the expected gains due to adjustment. This model represents a computational challenge, because the wage, the aggregate demand factor, the stochastic discount factor, and therefore also the value function all depend on the aggregate state . In general equilibrium, at any time t, there will be many …rms i facing di¤erent idiosyncratic shocks A it and stuck at di¤erent prices P it . The state of the economy will therefore include the entire distribution of prices and productivities. The reason for the popularity of the Calvo model is that even though …rms have many di¤erent prices, up to a …rst-order approximation only the average price matters for equilibrium. Unfortunately, this property does not hold in general, and in the current context, we need to treat all equilibrium quantities explicitly as functions of the distribution of prices and productivity across the economy. To calculate equilibrium, we therefore need an algorithm that takes account of the distributional dynamics.
We attack this problem by implementing Reiter's (2008) solution method for dynamic general equilibrium models with heterogeneous agents and aggregate shocks. The …rst step in Reiter's algorithm is to calculate the steady state general equilibrium that obtains in the absence of aggregate shocks. Idiosyncratic shocks are still active, but are assumed to have converged to their ergodic distribution, so an aggregate steady state means that , W , and # are all constant. 7 We indicate the steady state by dropping as an argument of the value function and other equilibrium objects, so the Bellman equation can be written as: Bellman equation in partial equilibrium steady state:
Here R 1 is the steady state of the stochastic discount factor Q, and
This steady state Bellman equation is a standard dynamic programming problem, except for the timing of the max operator. A natural solution method is backwards induction on a two-dimensional grid P A , 7 More precisely, we allow these variables to have a nominal trend, and search for a steady state in real terms. Detrending is discussed in Sec. 3.5. where P is a …nite grid of possible values of P i , and A is a grid of possible values of A i . However, before we de…ne notation that con…nes the dynamics to a grid, it is useful to describe the general equilibrium and detrend the model with respect to money growth, leaving all quantities in real terms.
Alternative sticky price frameworks
As we have stressed, our model can nest a number of alternative pricing frameworks, either by changing the parameters or the functional form of the adjustment probability , or by rede…ning the gains function G. All the following cases are then nested in a Bellman equation of form (3).
1. Calvo pricing: Suppose prices adjust each period with probability , where is an exogenous constant.
Then the Bellman equation is the same as (3), if we set (D=W ) . This is the special case of (2) in which = 0.
Fixed menu costs:
Suppose it costs units of labor to adjust prices in any given period, where is an exogenous constant called the "menu cost". Then the Bellman equation is given by (3), with
, where 1 fD W g is an indicator function taking value one when D W and zero otherwise. In this case the function has form (2), with = and = 1. 
4. Information-constrained pricing: Woodford (2008) proposes a model in which managers decide on when to review a price based on imprecise awareness of current market conditions. His model implies the following adjustment probability function:
where is a …xed cost of purchasing information, and 1 represents the marginal cost of information.
General equilibrium
We next embed this partial equilibrium decision framework in an otherwise standard New Keynesian general equilibrium, following the setup of Golosov and Lucas (2007) . In addition to the …rms, there is a representative household and a monetary authority that chooses the money supply.
Households
The household's period utility function is
where u and v are increasing, concave functions, and x is an increasing, convex function. Utility is discounted by factor per period. Consumption C t is a Spence-Dixit-Stiglitz aggregate of di¤erentiated products:
N t is labor supply, and M t =P t is real money balances. The household's period budget constraint is
is total nominal spending on the di¤erentiated goods. B t is nominal bond holdings, with interest rate R t 1; T t represents lump sum transfers received from the monetary authority, and t represents dividend payments received from the …rms.
Households choose fC it ; N t ; B t ; M t g 1 t=0 to maximize expected discounted utility, subject to the budget constraint (9) . Optimal allocation of consumption across di¤erentiated goods implies
where P t is the following price index:
This means we can rewrite nominal spending as
8 Optimal labor supply and money holdings imply the …rst-order conditions
and the Euler equation is
Monetary policy
We assume the growth rate of the money supply follows an exogenous stochastic process:
where t = exp(z t ), and z t is AR (1):
Here 0 z < 1 and
) is a money growth shock. Thus the money supply trends upward by approximately factor 1 per period on average. Seigniorage revenues are paid to the household as a lump sum transfer, and the government budget is balanced each period. Therefore the government's budget constraint is
Aggregate consistency
Bond market clearing is simply B t = 0. Market clearing for good i implies the following demand and supply relations for …rm i:
Also, total labor supply must equal total labor demand:
Labor market clearing condition (18) also de…nes a weighted measure of price dispersion,
it di, which generalizes the dispersion measure in Yun (2005) to allow for heterogeneous productivity. As in Yun's paper, an increase in t decreases the consumption goods produced per unit of labor, e¤ectively acting like a negative shock to aggregate productivity. 9 At this point, we have spelled out all equilibrium conditions, so we are ready to consider how to de…ne the aggregate state variable t . To do so, it helps to distinguish idiosyncratic states (prices and productivities) before price adjustment from those after adjustment. Thus we again use the notation e P it to refer to …rm i's price at the beginning of period t, prior to adjustment, and P it to indicate the price at which it actually produces. Likewise, we indicate the distribution of beginning-of-period prices and productivities as e t ( e P it ; A it ), writing the distribution of prices and productivities at the time of production as t (P it ; A it ).
The aggregate state of the economy at time t depends, among other things, on the money supply M t . Since the growth rate of money is AR(1) over time, the latest deviation in growth rates, z t , is a state variable too. For any given …rm i, the individual state variables that are relevant for time t decisions are the beginning-of-period price and productivity ( e P it ; A it ). Thus one possible de…nition of the time t aggregate state is t (M t ; z t ; e t ): M t and z t are a su¢ cient statistic for the Markov process driving the money supply, and e t is the beginning-of-t distribution of idiosyncratic states.
However, this is not the only possible de…nition of the aggregate state. Nominal prices are unadjusted between the time of production in t 1 and the beginning of t, so the distributions t 1 and e t di¤er only due to the exogenous Markov process that drives idiosyncratic productivity. In other words, t 1 is known if and only if e t is known. Therefore an alternative representation of the time t aggregate state is
This is the representation of the aggregate state that we will actually use, because it turns out to be algebraically convenient. As we will see in Section 5.1, representation (19) allows us to de…ne the full dynamic equilibrium equation system in a form that substitutes out many variables and equations.
The …rm' s problem in general equilibrium
The setup of sections 3.1-3.3 holds regardless of how …rms set prices. That is, regardless of the price-setting mechanism, C t , N t , P t , W t , R t , C it , P it , and M t must obey equations (8) - (18) . In particular, to make the …rm's problem (3) consistent with the goods market clearing conditions (17), the aggregate demand shift factor must be
Also, we assume that the representative household owns the …rms, so the stochastic discount factor in the …rm's problem must be consistent with the household's Euler equation (14) . Therefore the appropriate stochastic discount factor is
To write the …rm's problem in general equilibrium, we simply plug (20) and (21) into the …rm's problem (3). Showing time subscripts for transparency, the value of producing with price P it and productivity A it is Bellman equation in general equilibrium:
where G(P it ; A i;t+1 ; t+1 ) has the form described in (4) or one of the forms associated with the alternative sticky price frameworks mentioned in Section 2.2.
Detrending
So far we have written the value function and all prices in nominal terms, but it is natural to assume that we can rewrite the model in real terms. Thus, suppose we de ‡ate all prices by the nominal money stock, de…ning p t P t =M t , p it P it =M t , and w t W t =M t . Given the nominal distribution t (P i ; A i ) and the money stock M t , let us denote by t (p i ; A i ) the distribution over real production prices p it P it =M t . Likewise, let e t (e p i ; A i ) be the distribution of real beginning-of-period prices e p it e P it =M t , in analogy to the beginning-ofperiod distribution of nominal prices e t ( e P i ; A i ). If the model can be rewritten in real terms, then the level of the money supply, M t , must be irrelevant for determining real quantities. Therefore, to describe the real equilibrium, it su¢ ces to condition on the real state variable t (z t ; t 1 ), instead of the full nominal state t (M t ; z t ; t 1 ). 10 The "real" value function v should likewise be the nominal value function, divided by the current money stock, and should be written as a function of real variables. That is,
De ‡ating in this way, the Bellman equation can be rewritten as follows (see the appendix for details). Detrended Bellman equation, general equilibrium:
; A i;t+1 ; t+1
Let p (A i;t+1 ; t+1 ) denote the optimal choice in the maximization problem above. Taking into account the fact that the …rm starts period t + 1 with the eroded price e p i;t+1 p it = t+1 , the real price process is
p (A i;t+1 ; t+1 ) with probability
with probability 1
In other words, when the …rm's nominal price remains unadjusted at time t + 1, its real price is de ‡ated by factor t+1 .
4 Computing general equilibrium: steady state
Discrete numerical model
For computational purposes, we next approximate the economy by assuming that individual states, in real terms, always lie on a …nite grid. 11 This allows us to solve the …rm's problem numerically by backwards induction. This procedure is entirely standard, but we will spell out the details, both to see how it nests into the general equilibrium and in order to clarify our calculations later when we study the e¤ects of aggregate shocks.
Thus 
without requiring that it be chosen from the grid p , because our solution method requires policies to vary smoothly with aggregate conditions. 12 We will write the policies at the productivity grid points a k 2 a as a row vector p p 1 :::p
. We also de…ne several other # p # a matrices: the adjustment values D, the probabilities , and the expected gains G, with (j; k) elements given by
We can now write the discrete Bellman equation and the discrete distributional dynamics in a precise way. The dynamics involve three transitions. First, suppose a …rm has beginning-of-t price e p it = p j 2 p and productivity A it = a k 2 a . This …rm will adjust its production price to p it = p k with probability jk , or will leave it unchanged (p it = e p it = p j ) with probability 1 jk . If adjustment occurs, we maintain our grid-based approximation by rounding p k up or down stochastically to the nearest grid points. To be precise, suppose p k lies between grid points l 1 and l, that is,
, and down to p l 1 with probability (p
. This transition can be summarized in matrix notation. Let E IJ be an I J matrix of ones. Assume p is chosen wide enough so that
a matrix P that rounds the policy function stochastically up or down to the nearest grid points:
Then we can calculate distribution t from e t as follows:
where (as in MATLAB) the operator : represents element-by-element multiplication, and represents ordinary matrix multiplication. The second step in the distributional dynamics is to adjust real prices to take account of steady state money growth. Ignoring grids, the time t price p it is de ‡ated to e p i;t+1 p it = at the beginning of t + 1. To keep prices on the grid, we de…ne a # p # p Markov matrix R in which the row m, column l element is
When e p i;t+1 falls between two grid points, matrix R must round up or down stochastically. When e p i;t+1 moves down past the least element of the grid, matrix R must round up to keep prices on the grid.
14 Therefore we construct R according to
1 2 Ensuring di¤erentiability of all equilibrium objects is discussed in Appendix B.
The third and …nal step in the distributional dynamics is to take into account the Markov matrix S that governs the idiosyncratic productivity shocks A i . The row m, column k element of S is the exogenous probability
Combining the second and third steps, we can calculate the beginning-of-period distribution e t+1 at t + 1 as a function of the time t distribution of production prices t :
The simplicity of this equation comes partly from the fact that the exogenous shocks to A i;t+1 are independent of the in ‡ation adjustment that links e p i;t+1 with p it . Also, exogenous shocks are represented from left to right in the matrix t , so that their transitions can be treated by right multiplication, while policies are represented vertically, so that transitions related to policies can be treated by left multiplication.
The same transition matrices show up when we write the Bellman equation in matrix form. Let U be the # p # a matrix of current payo¤s, with elements
for p j ; a k 2 . Then the Bellman equation is Steady state general equilibrium Bellman equation, matrix version:
Since the Bellman equation iterates backwards in time, it involves probability transitions represented by R 0 and S, whereas the distributional dynamics iterate forward in time and therefore contain R and S 0 . Finally, in addition to these matrix equations, there are four scalar equations relating to …rst-order conditions and aggregate consistency conditions:
Equations (23)- (36) fully describe the steady state general equilibrium. The unknowns are the matrices V, D, , G, P, R, U, , and e ; the vector p ; and the scalars w, p, N , and C. While this seems like a huge system of equations, it is easy to solve because it reduces to a small scalar …xed-point problem. We solve it under linear labor disutility, x(N ) = N . In this case, guessing p permits us to calculate w and C analytically from equations (33) and (34) . We can then construct matrix U from (31), so we are ready to solve the Bellman equation (32) to …nd V and P. We then …nd the steady state price distributions and e from (28) and (30) . Knowing distribution , we can calculate the price level p from (36) . Thus, …nding a …xed point in p allows us to construct the entire steady state equilibrium. 15 
Results: steady state
This steady state model can be calibrated by comparing its predictions to cross-sectional data on price changes, like those reported in Klenow and Kryvstov (2005) , Midrigan (2008) , and Nakamura and Steinsson (2007) . In a companion paper, Costain and Nakov (2008), we report detailed results from a variety of speci…cations, and compare the model's behavior under low and high steady-state in ‡ation rates. Here we simply brie ‡y discuss our preferred estimate from that paper, which minimizes an equally-weighted sum of two terms: the absolute di¤erence between the mean adjustment frequency in the model and that in the data, plus the distance between the histogram of price changes in the model and that in the data. We will simulate our model at monthly frequency, for consistency with the results reported in the empirical literature. Also, since these papers all attempt to remove price changes attributable to temporary "sales", our simulation results should be interpreted as a model of "regular" price changes unrelated to sales.
We take our utility parameterization from Golosov and Lucas (2007) . Hence, we set the discount factor to = 1:04 1 per year; consumption utility is CRRA, u(C) = , with = 2. Labor disutility is linear, x(N ) = N , with = 6. The utility of real money holdings is logarithmic, v(m) = log(m), with = 1. The elasticity of substitution in the consumption aggregator is = 7. The steady state growth rate of money is set to zero, consistent with the zero average price change found in the AC Nielsen dataset used to estimate the model.
Given these utility parameters, we estimate the idiosyncratic productivity shock process and the adjustment process to match data on the distribution of regular price changes. We assume productivity is AR(1) in logs:
where " a it is a mean-zero, normal, iid shock. There are two free parameters of the productivity process: and 2 " , the variance of " a it , while the adjustment process has three free parameters, ; ; and , in the function class we have imposed, (7) . Each of them is estimated to best …t the size distribution of price adjustments in the AC Nielsen data, and to match Nakamura and Steinsson's (2007) measure of the median frequency of price adjustments (which is lower, but presumably more robust, than measures based on means). All versions of the model match the target adjustment frequency of 10% per month almost exactly. Our preferred estimate also does a good job of hitting the moments of the distribution of price adjustments. The mean absolute price change is 10% in the model, and 10.5% in the data; the median is slightly lower in both cases because the distribution has fat tails. In the model, the standard deviation of the distribution of price changes is 11.8%, and the kurtosis is 2.7; in the data they are 13.2% and 3.5. Half of all price adjustments in the data are increases, and we obtain very nearly the same …gure in the model. Figure 1 graphs a variety of objects that characterize the stationary equilibrium under the SDSP speci…cation. 17 In the …rst plot we see the value function, as a function of prices and marginal cost (one over productivity); the lowest value occurs when the highest marginal cost is paired with the lowest price. The fourth and sixth plots show the distributions e at the beginning of the period and at the time of production. The production distribution looks rather like a sail-backed dinosaur: the "sail" represents the mass of …rms that have adjusted to the optimal price conditional on current productivity. At the beginning of the next period, this mass gets spread out by the productivity shock process, resulting in the smooth distribution e seen in the fourth graph. Graphing the policy function in the eighth plot shows that the …rm sets prices closer to the mean than would be the case under ‡exible prices, in anticipation of mean reversion of the technology process.
The last graph shows the distribution of nominal price adjustments, which is mildly bimodal around zero, and resembles quite closely the AC Nielsen data of supermarket price changes reported in Midrigan (2008) and reproduced here in shaded bars. The …t is especially good in the middle range, though the tails are somewhat fatter in the data than in the model, as the di¤erence in kurtosis indicates.
The seventh panel of Figure 1 shows the probability of price adjustment, as a function of the value of adjustment. The probability of adjustment initially rises very quickly, but it then quickly levels o¤, remaining below 20% when the loss from failing to adjust is 1% of the value of the …rm (which is the largest value seen in the graph). On one hand, this function points to a low degree of state dependence: the probability of adjustment in any given month is still well below 0.5 even if several percentage points of the value of the …rm are at stake. On the other hand, few …rms actually come to su¤er large losses, since the range shown in the seventh panel of Fig. 1 includes almost all the variation actually observed in the simulation; adjustment normally occurs before leaving this range. Thus the median loss is just 0.07% of median …rm value, and the mean loss (which is larger since the loss distribution is highly skewed) is 0.27% of median …rm value.
Finally, it is helpful to consider the computational implications of the relatively large but infrequent price adjustments seen in the data. On the 201 by 201 grid with a median absolute price change of around 9%, a typical price movement by …rms in our baseline SDSP simulation is a jump of about 12 steps in the price grid p . Clearly then, at any point in time most …rms lie several steps away from their optimal prices; the table shows that the typical deviation from the optimal price ranges from 4.4% (in terms of the median) to 7.7% (on average), depending on the model. This suggests that constraining price adjustment to a …nite grid is relatively unimportant both for price dynamics and for welfare analysis. We con…rm this fact in Table 1 by recomputing the model (under the SDSP calibration) on a much coarser grid, with only 25 possible productivities (spanning 2:5 standard deviations instead of 5 standard deviations) and only 31 possible prices. Thus, in the coarser grid, each price step represents a 2.5% price change, instead of the 0.7% in the previous calculation.
This dramatic coarsening of the grid has only minor consequences for the performance of the model. The statistic that changes most is the fraction of small price changes, which decreases from 25.2% to 24.8%. The other statistics are barely altered, including the welfare losses caused by price stickiness. Thus, computing the dynamics on a …nite grid seems unimportant for the results, even when the grid is quite coarse. This is very helpful for our purposes, because it suggests that the more numerically challenging problem of characterizing the distributional dynamics can also be studied on a coarse grid.
Computing general equilibrium: dynamics
To characterize our model's general equilibrium dynamics in the presence of both idiosyncratic and aggregate shocks, we implement the algorithm of Reiter (2008). Reiter's method recognizes that the large system of nonlinear equations we solved to calculate the general equilibrium steady state can also be interpreted as a system of nonlinear …rst-order autonomous di¤erence equations describing the dynamics of a grid-based approximation to general equilibrium away from steady state. In the absence of strong strategic complementarities or an inappropriate Taylor rule that might give rise to indeterminacy, such an equation system can be solved by perfectly standard linear simulation techniques. We will solve for the saddle-path stable solution of our linearized model using the QZ decomposition, following Klein (2000) .
The crucial thing to notice about Reiter's method is that it combines linearity and nonlinearity in a way appropriate for the model at hand. In our model, idiosyncratic shocks are likely to be larger and more economically important for individual …rms'decisions than aggregate shocks. This is true in many macroeconomic contexts (e.g. precautionary saving) and in particular Klenow and Kryvstov (2008) , Golosov and Lucas (2007) , and Midrigan (2008) argue that …rms'pricing decisions appear to be driven primarily by idiosyncratic shocks. Therefore, to deal with large idiosyncratic shocks, we treat functions of idiosyncratic states in a fully nonlinear way, by calculating them on a grid. As we emphasized above, this grid-based solution can be regarded as a large system of nonlinear equations, with equations speci…c to each of the grid points. By linearizing each of these equations with respect to the aggregate dynamics, we recognize that aggregate changes are unlikely to a¤ect individual value functions in a strongly nonlinear way. That is, we are implicitly assuming that both money supply shocks and changes in the distributions and e have su¢ ciently smooth e¤ects on individual values that a linear treatment of these e¤ects is su¢ cient. On the other hand, we need not start from any assumption of approximate aggregation like that required for the method of Krusell and Smith (1998) .
Thus, we will write the general equilibrium dynamics as a system of di¤erence equations. For parsimonious notation in this context, we indicate dependence on the aggregate state by time subscripts, instead of by writing endogenous variables as functions of t . We will see that the di¤erence equation system is a straightforward generalization of the steady state equations from the previous section. First, the time t money growth process is t = exp(z t ), where
where z t is an iid normal shock with mean zero and standard deviation z . Second, the …rms' Bellman equation can be written as a # p # a matrix system of equations for each (p j ; a k ) 2 . Let U t be the matrix of current pro…ts, so that the (j; k) element of U t is
Write the value function as a matrix V t , with (j; k) element equal to v
We can write the Bellman equation as Dynamic general equilibrium Bellman equation, matrix version:
All quantities in the Bellman equation are analogous to corresponding quantities in the steady state equilibrium. The matrix G t+1 is de…ned by
and t+1 is the matrix with (l; m) element lm t+1 d lm t+1 =w t+1 . The expectation E t in the Bellman equation refers only to the e¤ects of the time t + 1 money shock t+1 , because the shocks and dynamics of the idiosyncratic state (p j ; a k ) 2 are completely described by the matrices R 0 t+1 and S. Note that S has no time subscript, and is exactly the same matrix described in the previous section. The Markov matrix R t+1 di¤ers from the steady state matrix R only because in the fully dynamic equilibrium we must detrend by the realized money shock t+1 instead of trend money growth . The row n, column l element of R t+1 , which we will call R nl t+1 , is
As for the distributional dynamics, the two steps are analogous to the steady state case:
Matrix P t is constructed from the policy function
in the same way as in the steady state. 18 If p l(k) is the …rst price grid point greater than or equal to p k t , then P t takes value
in row l(k), column k; and value
in row l(k) 1, column k; and is zero elsewhere.
Finally, the remaining equations that must be satis…ed by the dynamic general equilibrium are
Linearization
We are now ready to calculate the general equilibrium dynamics by linearization. To do so, we eliminate as many variables from the equation system as we can. For additional simplicity, we assume linear labor disutility, x(N ) = N . Thus the …rst-order condition for labor reduces to p t = w t u 0 (C t ), so we don't actually need to solve for N t in order to calculate the rest of the equilibrium. 19 Under the linear labor disutility assumption, we can summarize the whole general equilibrium system in terms of the exogenous shock process z t , the endogenous 'jump' variables V t , C t , and p t , and the lagged distribution of idiosyncratic states t 1 , which is the endogenous component of the time t aggregate state. The full system of equations reduces to
Counting element by element the matrix equations (49) and (52) each contain # p # a scalar equations, and therefore the whole system contains 2# p # a + 3 nonlinear di¤erence equations. If we now collapse all the endogenous variables into a single vector
then the whole set of expectational di¤erence equations (49)-(53) governing the dynamic equilibrium becomes a …rst-order system of the following form:
where E t is an expectation conditional on z t and all previous shocks. Together, the endogenous vector ! X t and the shock process z t amount to a list of 2# p # a + 3 variables. To see that these are in fact the only variables we need, because all others can be substituted out. Given z t and z t+1 we can construct t , and t+1 , and thus R t and R t+1 . Given R t , we can construct e t = R t t 1 S 0 from t 1 . Under linear labor disutility, we can calculate w t = p t =u 0 (C t ), which gives us all the information needed to construct U t . Finally, given V t and V t+1 we can construct P t , D t , and D t+1 , and thus t and G t+1 . Therefore the variables in ! X t and z t are indeed su¢ cient to evaluate the system (49)-(53). Finally, if we linearize system F numerically with respect to all its arguments to construct the Jacobian matrices A D ! X t+1 F, B D ! X t F, C D zt+1 F, and D D zt F, then we obtain the following …rst-order linear expectational di¤erence equation system:
where represents a deviation from steady state. This system has the form considered by Klein (2000) , so we solve our model using his QZ decomposition method. 20 6 Results: dynamics
E¤ects of money growth shocks
We now study the impulse response functions implied by money supply shocks in several versions of our model. 21 Figures 3 and 5 show the response to a 1% increase in money supply growth in our SDSP calibration, and compare it with the response in the Calvo and …xed menu cost cases. All three versions are simulated under the same parameters, and the same aggregate and idiosyncratic shock processes, assuming zero trend in ‡ation.
Only the parameterization of the adjustment probability function di¤ers across speci…cations. Each impulse response is calculated starting from the steady state distribution of prices and productivities associated with the corresponding speci…cation. Figure 3 shows impulse responses under the assumption that money supply growth is iid, while Figure 5 assumes money growth has monthly autocorrelation of 0.8 (0.51 at quarterly frequency).
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As in any New Keynesian model, the impulse responses show that an increase in money growth stimulates consumption. Since not all prices adjust instantaneously, increased money growth raises households'real money balances, thus increasing consumption demand. However, as Golosov and Lucas (2007) emphasized, the average price level adjusts rapidly in the …xed menu cost speci…cation, so there is a large, short-lived spike in the in ‡ation rate. Therefore changes in real variables are small and not very persistent, approaching the monetary neutrality associated with full price ‡exibility. On the other hand, the response of our SDSP model (lines with round dots) mostly lies between the responses seen in the Calvo (lines with squares) and …xed menu cost (lines with crosses) speci…cations, and it is typically much closer to the Calvo case. In particular, since is much less than one for almost all …rms in our SDSP model, prices rise much more gradually in our preferred model than they would under …xed menu costs, leading to a large and persistent increase in output resembling the response in the Calvo speci…cation.
Impulse responses are also plotted for a number of other macroeconomic variables. It can be shown analytically that nominal interest rates depend on expected future money growth only (insert (13) into (46) to rewrite the Euler equation in terms of R t , R t+1 , and t+1 only). Deviations of the nominal interest rate from steady state are proportional to those of money growth, with factor of proportionality
. 23 Thus when money growth is uncorrelated ( z = 0), nominal interest rates are constant, as we see in the third panel of Fig. 3 . As for real interest rates, the fact that consumption rises above its long term level in response to an increase in money growth means that real interest rates must fall. Also, the real wage must rise, because labor must increase in order to produce the additional consumption goods. We also plot the response of price dispersion, de…ned as
Alternatively, the equation system can be rewritten in the form of Sims (2001) . We chose to implement the Klein method because it is especially simple and transparent to program. 2 1 Our results can be reproduced by running our MATLAB programs, which are available for download at http://www.econ.upf.edu/~nakov/dyn_programs.zip. 2 2 For numerical tractability we compute equilibrium on the coarse grid of 25 productivities and 31 price levels analyzed in Table  1 and Figure 2 , which yields a distribution of price changes similar to that on a much …ner grid. 2 3 Therefore, as is common in sticky-price models driven by money supply shocks, the 'anticipated in ‡ation e¤ect' is stronger than the 'liquidity e¤ect', so increased money growth (if autocorrelated) causes the nominal interest rate to rise. The issue of the 'liquidity e¤ect'in sticky price models is discussed in Gali (2003).
In our setup, part of the reason …rms set di¤erent prices is that they face di¤erent productivities. But additional price dispersion, caused by failure to adjust when necessary, implies ine¢ cient variation in demand across goods that acts like a negative aggregate productivity shock: N t = t C t . In a representative agent model near a zero-in ‡ation steady state, the dispersion wedge t is negligible because it is roughly proportional to the cross-sectional variance of prices, a quantity which is of second order in the in ‡ation rate. 24 But the crosssectional variance of prices is not second order in the in ‡ation rate when idiosyncratic shocks are present. Thus variations in t are often quantitatively important, especially since = 7 strongly magni…es variations in the ratio p j =p t . In the third row of Fig. 3 we see that increased money growth throws …rms' prices further out of line with fundamentals, increasing dispersion, especially in the SDSP and Calvo speci…cations where prices are less ‡exible. Therefore increasing consumption requires a proportionally larger increase in labor in these speci…cations.
Next, comparing Figures 3 and 5 , we note that while the shape of the in ‡ation and output responses di¤ers substantially across models, it is qualitatively similar under iid money growth and autocorrelated money growth. Unsurprisingly, in ‡ation spikes immediately under …xed menu costs and iid money growth. More interestingly, it does the same under …xed menu costs and autocorrelated money growth, because the average price increase rises by much more than 1% (in ‡ation immediately jumps by 2% when money growth jumps by 1%, because …rms anticipate that money growth will remain positive for some time). On the other hand, there is a smaller but more persistent rise in in ‡ation in our SDSP speci…cation and in the Calvo speci…cation. Note that the persistence of in ‡ation does not di¤er noticeably depending on the autocorrelation of money growth, but instead appears to be determined primarily by the degree of price stickiness. Thus the big di¤erence between the in ‡ation and output responses in Figures 3 and 5 is one of size, not of shape: the overall response is larger when money growth is more autocorrelated. Table 2 reports additional calculations regarding the extent of monetary nonneutrality in various parameterizations of our model. As in Section VI of Golosov and Lucas (2007), we address this issue by asking the following question: if money supply shocks were the only source of in ‡ation variation, how much output variation would they cause? That is, for each speci…cation, we pick the variance of the money supply shock to match 100% of observed US in ‡ation volatility, and then calculate the implied variability of output. Interestingly, in the SDSP case, money shocks would explain almost all US output ‡uctuation (96%, if money growth is assumed iid ; or 91%, if autocorrelated). Under the Calvo speci…cation, implied output ‡uctuations would be about 40% larger. With menu costs, the …gure is much lower: money supply shocks would only explain 26% or 29% of output ‡uctuations. 25 In addition, we calculate a "Phillips curve" coe¢ cient by regressing output growth on money growth; the coe¢ cient is at least twice as large in the SDSP speci…cation as it is in the …xed menu cost speci…cation (and is much larger if money growth is autocorrelated). None of these calculations should be taken as conclusive, since both in ‡ation and output are a¤ected by many other shocks besides money shocks; but they do all demonstrate that a model calibrated to match microdata on price adjustments yields much greater monetary nonneutrality than a model with …xed menu costs does.
In ‡ation decompositions
To further understand how the real e¤ects of money shocks di¤er across models, we next decompose changes in the in ‡ation rate into three main 'e¤ects'mentioned in many recent papers. A variety of decompositions have been proposed, which di¤er both in details and in substance, but all start from the observation that in ‡ation is an average of log nominal price changes. In our framework, all nominal price changes occur at the beginning of the period, starting from the beginning-of-period distribution e t . The nominal in ‡ation rate at time t is This leads to the following in ‡ation decomposition:
where, as in Section 4, variables without time subscripts represent steady states, and represents a deviation from steady state. 26 Klenow and Kryvstov's "intensive margin", I
KK t x t , is the part of in ‡ation attributable to changes in the average price adjustment. Their "extensive margin", E KK t x t , is the part of in ‡ation attributable to changes in the frequency of price adjustment.
A weakness of Klenow and Kryvstov's decomposition is that an increase in the average log price adjustment x t may be caused by a rise in all …rms'desired price adjustments, or by a reallocation of adjustment opportunities from …rms desiring small or negative price changes to others desiring large positive price changes. That is, I
KK t mixes the e¤ect of changes in desired adjustments (the only relevant issue in time-dependent pricing models like that of Calvo) with the "selection e¤ect" emphasized by Golosov and Lucas in their paper on state-dependent pricing. Therefore, we prefer a decomposition that breaks in ‡ation into three terms: an intensive margin that captures changes in the average desired log price change, an extensive margin that captures changes in how many …rms adjust, and a selection e¤ect that captures changes in who adjusts.
All three e¤ects can be de…ned clearly if we start by rewriting (56) as
Note that in (59), x t is the average desired log price change, whereas in (57), x t is the average log price change among those who adjust. Thus (59) says that in ‡ation equals the mean preferred adjustment times the adjustment frequency plus a selection term P j;k x jk t jk t t e jk t = P j;k jk t x jk t
x t e jk t that can be nonzero whenever some sizes of price adjustments x jk t are more or less likely than the mean probability of adjustment t , or (equivalently) when …rms with di¤erent probabilities of adjustment jk t tend to prefer adjustments that di¤er from the mean preferred adjustment x t . Equation (59) leads us to the following in ‡ation decomposition:
Our intensive margin e¤ect, I t x t , is the e¤ect of changing all …rms' desired adjustment by the same amount (or more generally, changing the mean preferred adjustment in a way that is uncorrelated with the adjustment probability). Obviously I is the only nonzero term in the Calvo model, where jk t = for all j, k, and t. Our extensive margin e¤ect, E t x t , is the e¤ect of changing the fraction of …rms that adjust, if we select the new adjusters (or new nonadjusters) randomly. Our selection e¤ect, S t P j;k x jk t jk t t e jk t , is the e¤ect of redistributing adjustment opportunities across …rms with di¤erent desired adjustments x jk t , while …xing the overall fraction that adjust. The selection term is zero in the Calvo model, and also in a statedependent model if we happen to start from a distribution with no heterogeneity ( e jk t = 1 for some particular j and k). 
They further simplify this to
under the assumption that all desired price adjustments change by x jk t = t when money growth increases by t , and by taking an ergodic average so that the last term drops out. 28 Note that their …rst term, I CE t , is the same as our intensive margin I, as long as their assumption that all desired price adjustments change by t is correct. But therefore, their "extensive margin" term E CE P j;k x jk jk t e jk , combines the issue of how many …rms adjust (our extensive margin E t ) with the issue of who adjusts (our selection e¤ect S t ), which we think it is clearer to consider separately. The second rows of Figures 3 and 5 illustrate our decomposition of the in ‡ation impulse response. (The in ‡ation decomposition at the time of the shock, t = 1, is also presented in Table 3 .) The panels representing in ‡ation and its three components I t , E t , and S t are shown to the same scale for better comparison. The graphs unambiguously illustrate that the short, sharp rise in in ‡ation observed in the …xed menu cost speci…cation results from the selection e¤ect. This is true both under iid money shocks, where in ‡ation spikes to 0.451% on impact, of which 0.353% is the selection component, and under autocorrelated shocks, where in ‡ation spikes to 1.94%, with 1.48% due to selection. In contrast, in ‡ation in the Calvo model is caused by the intensive margin only; in SDSP there is a nontrivial selection e¤ect but it still only accounts for around one-third of the impulse response of in ‡ation.
We also see that the extensive margin, E t x t , plays a negligible role in the in ‡ation impulse response. This makes sense, because we are considering a steady state with zero in ‡ation, so steady state price adjustments are responses to idiosyncratic shocks only, and the average desired adjustment x must be close to zero. Therefore E t is tiny even though the adjustment frequency t does vary, rising from 10% to 12.5% on impact in the MC model, and from 10% to 10.3% on impact in SDSP. 29 The extensive margin only becomes important when there is high trend in ‡ation: then the average desired adjustment x is large and positive, because …rms that have not adjusted recently need to make substantial price increases. Variations in t then account for a large part of the in ‡ationary impact of money growth, as we see in Table 3 and Figure 6 , which analyze money supply shocks in an equilibrium with 63% in ‡ation per annum (the highest rate observed in the Mexican data of Gagnon, 2007) . 30 Money supply shocks imply a bigger spike in in ‡ation when trend in ‡ation is high, bringing the model even closer to monetary neutrality in this case than it was in Figure 3 , and much of this di¤erence is due to the extensive margin.
Turning to the intensive margin, on impact the e¤ect is the same in all three models. This re ‡ects the fact that an uncorrelated 1% increase in money growth raises the mean desired price change by approximately 1 percentage point in all three models, implying an initial intensive margin e¤ect I 1 x 1 of 0.1 percentage points (since we calibrated all models to = 0:1). The importance of the intensive margin fades quickly in the MC model, since those desiring the largest price changes do in fact adjust immediately, but remains important in the speci…cations with lower state dependence. Likewise, the initial intensive margin e¤ect is larger, but the same across models, under autocorrelated money growth: the mean desired price change rises roughly …ve percentage points in all three speci…cations, so that I 1 x 1 0:5%. That is, …rms want to "frontload" prices in response to autocorrelated money shocks by roughly the same amount in all three speci…cations; the di¤erence is that in the MC case many of these changes take place immediately, whereas they are only gradually realized under the other speci…cations.
We can also understand the three e¤ects by examining Figure 4 , which illustrates the distribution of price adjustments, before and after an increase in money growth. As we have emphasized, the distribution of adjustments in the MC model is strongly bimodal. The main e¤ect of an increase in money growth is to make large price decreases less likely, and large price increases more likely, causing a large increase in in ‡ation overall.
This redistribution in adjustment probabilities is, by our de…nition, a selection e¤ect. In contrast, in the Calvo case, the whole distribution of adjustments shifts right with no change in shape, which by our de…nition is an intensive margin change. In the SDSP case, the change mostly resembles a rightward shift of the distribution, but we can also see some redistribution of adjustment probability from the left mode of the distribution to the right mode, so both the intensive margin and the selection e¤ect are active in this case. As for the extensive margin, little di¤erence in the overall adjustment frequency t is visible in the graphs, even in the MC case.
In summary, the sharp state dependence of the …xed menu cost model is the key to understanding both its implications for the distribution of price adjustments and its implications for monetary neutrality. We say that the state dependence is strong under …xed menu costs because it implies that is a step function: at the threshold, a tiny increase in the value of adjustment su¢ ces to increase the adjustment probability from 0 to 1. This behavior implies that the distribution of price changes consists of two spikes: there are no small changes, and …rms cannot drift outside the adjustment thresholds before change takes place. Hence, in steady state, those …rms whose behavior might be a¤ected by a money shock are all near the two adjustment thresholds. Therefore, the main e¤ect of an increase in money growth is to decrease from 1 to 0 for some …rms desiring a price decrease, while increasing from 0 to 1 for some …rms desiring a price increase. This selection e¤ect implies a strong change in in ‡ation, and monetary near-neutrality, as Golosov and Lucas argued. But it depends on an extreme degree of state dependence which our estimates reject. This may help explain why money shocks do, in aggregate time series, appear to have important real e¤ects.
The role of the distribution
Besides calculating the impact of money growth shocks, we can also calculate transitional dynamics, which shed light on a number of issues. Figure 7 illustrates transitional dynamics of the SDSP calibration of the model, starting from a variety of di¤erent initial conditions. Figure 8 shows how the impulse response to a money supply shock changes when starting from di¤erent initial conditions. Both …gures also illustrate nonlinear aspects of the dynamics that our hybrid linear/nonlinear solution method can capture. Figure 7 .1 shows the impact of a large monetary shock, but the calculations are carried out in a di¤erent way from those behind Figure 3 . Instead of starting at the steady state distribution and feeding in a money shock, we simply shift the distribution of real prices two grid points to the left. That is, we start from an initial distribution 0 such that jk 0 = j+2;k : the lagged distribution from period 0 is the steady state distribution, shifted left by two points in the price grid. Each step in the price grid is a di¤erence of 2.5%, so this amounts to a 5% real price decrease, which is also equivalent to an uncorrelated increase in money supply growth by 5%. By calculating the e¤ects of the shock in this way, we take nonlinear changes in the impulse response into account, since our computational method allows full nonlinearity between one grid point and the next. 31 Some of the impulse responses are proportional to those shown before; for example, the response of in ‡ation in Figure  7 .1 (a 0.77% rise on impact) is roughly …ve times larger than that shown for the SDSP calibration in the second panel of Figure 3 (a 0.15% rise). But the fraction of …rms adjusting (not shown) increases in a more-than-linear way, increasing eight times as much in this example compared with the example of Figure 3 , which makes sense since the value of adjustment increases nonlinearly in the distance from the optimal price. Since this especially a¤ects the prices that are furthest out of line, price dispersion falls substantially, whereas it increased in Figure  3 . This permits labor to decrease even as consumption rises.
In Figure 7 .2, we see how our model can also shed light on the e¤ects of technology shocks. The exercise is similar to that in Fig. 7 .1, but instead of shifting the distribution in the price direction, we shift the distribution by two grid points in the productivity direction: jk 0 = j;k+2 . Thus the transition dynamics in Fig. 7 .2 represent the e¤ect of a persistent, but not permanent, 6.1% increase in productivity. 32 The e¤ects con…rm that the implications of productivity shocks known from macroeconomic models based on Calvo pricing (e.g. Galí 1999) also occur under state-dependent pricing. Higher productivity drives in ‡ation down, and permits households to increase consumption while decreasing labor. Note that since prices take time to adjust, consumption takes time to reach its peak level; since consumption is initially growing and thereafter decreasing, the real interest rate …rst rises above its steady state level and then falls back below it. An additional e¤ect in our state-dependent model is that those prices pushed furthest out of line by the productivity shock are most likely to adjust (downwards). Therefore part of the decrease in in ‡ation is a selection e¤ect, and price dispersion falls as the most extreme prices adjust more than usual, permitting labor to fall further than it otherwise would. Figure 7 .3 shows one more example of transitional dynamics, in which we assume that all …rms start at their optimal sticky prices. That is, the initial (lagged) price distribution is jk 0 = l(k);k , where l(k) is the grid point associated with the steady state optimal price: p l(k) = p (a k ). This might be seen as the e¤ect of "introducing the euro": it is as if all …rms have just been forced to change prices, taking into account that their prices will be sticky in the future. Conditional on this one-time change, the fraction of …rms adjusting is thereafter below steady state (not shown), since they start out at their preferred price. We also see that the price dispersion measure starts out substantially below its steady state value. This acts as a positive productivity shock: …rms are on average closer to their e¢ cient prices, permitting more consumption with less labor input.
Finally, Figure 8 shows an example of how di¤erent initial conditions alter the e¤ects of a monetary shock, which is another non-linear phenomenon picked up by our solution method. For the SDSP calibration, it shows the e¤ect of an uncorrelated 1% increase in money supply at time 1, either starting from the steady state distribution (as seen previously in Fig. 3 ), or occurring simultaneously with an increase in aggregate productivity (that is, starting from jk 0 = j;k+2 , as in Fig. 7 .2). In both cases, we aim to show only the e¤ect of the money supply shock itself, so to graph the blue circled curve in Fig. 8 we …rst compute a path starting from a technology shock plus a money shock; then we compute a path starting from a technology shock only (that is, the path shown in Fig. 7. 2), and then we take the di¤erence between the two. Most of the impulse responses are essentially unchanged; in particular, the response of real consumption to the money shock is not altered by the starting distribution. However, note that the money supply shock, by o¤setting the incentive to decrease prices that results from the technology shock, decreases price dispersion in this case, requiring less increase in labor to …nance the same amount of consumption. Since labor is the most elastic choice variable here, it absorbs all the di¤erence.
Conclusions
In this paper, we have computed the impact of money growth shocks in a quantitative macroeconomic model of state-dependent pricing. We have calibrated the model for consistency with microeconomic data on …rms' pricing behavior. In particular, we have estimated how …rms'probability of price adjustment depends on the value of adjustment, adopting a ‡exible speci…cation that nests the Calvo speci…cation as one extreme, and the …xed menu cost speci…cation as the other extreme. Given our estimate of this adjustment function, we have then characterized the dynamics of the distribution of prices and productivities in general equilibrium.
In our calibrated model, we …nd that shocks to money growth have large, persistent e¤ects on real variables, only slightly weaker than the e¤ects found in the Calvo model. Prices rise gradually in response to increased money growth, leading to a persistent stimulative e¤ect on consumption and labor. Real interest rates fall; real wages and real money holdings rise; the nominal interest rate is constant if money growth is iid, and rises if money growth is autocorrelated. We also …nd that the main factor determining how monetary shocks propagate to the rest of the economy is the degree of state dependence. That is, the autocorrelation of money shocks has little e¤ect on the shape of the impulse responses of most variables and little e¤ect on their persistence. Instead, increasing the autocorrelation of money growth shocks simply makes their real e¤ects larger.
We show how the impulse response of in ‡ation can be decomposed into an intensive margin e¤ect relating to the average desired price adjustment, an extensive margin e¤ect relating to the number of …rms adjusting, and a selection e¤ect relating to changes in the relative frequencies of small and large or negative and positive adjustments. In our calibrated model, starting from a low baseline in ‡ation rate, about two-thirds of the e¤ect of a money growth shock comes through the intensive margin, and most of the rest through the selection e¤ect. The extensive margin only matters when starting from a high baseline in ‡ation rate.
As Golosov and Lucas (2007) argued, in a model of …xed menu costs the real e¤ects of money supply shocks are greatly decreased, because prices jump strongly on impact. They rightly attributed this to a selection e¤ect. However, such strong selection e¤ects only arise if a small change in the value of adjustment can cause a large jump in the probability of adjustment. Our estimate of the function governing the probability of adjustment rejects such extreme state dependence, favoring a speci…cation that behaves more like the Calvo model. As state dependence increases towards the …xed menu cost speci…cation, the distribution of price adjustments becomes more and more strongly bimodal. Weaker state dependence yields a more bell-shaped distribution of adjustments, which is more consistent with microdata. The weaker state dependence also implies that money growth shocks have nontrivial real e¤ects, as VAR evidence suggests.
Appendix A: Detrending
Suppose the model can be rewritten in real terms by de ‡ating all prices by the nominal money stock, de…ning p t P t =M t , p it P it =M t , and w t W t =M t . Given the nominal distribution t (P i ; A i ) and the money stock M t , we denote by t (p i ; A i ) the distribution over real production prices p it P it =M t . Likewise, let e t (p i ; A i ) be the distribution of real beginning-of-period prices e p it e P it =M t , in analogy to the beginning-of-period distribution of nominal prices e t ( e P i ; A i ). If it is true that the model can be rewritten in real terms, then it is not necessary to condition equilibrium behavior on M t ; conditioning on t (z t ; t 1 ) su¢ ces. 33 Therefore, if there exists a real equilibrium, the real aggregate functions can be written in terms of t only, and must satisfy
De ‡ating from one period to the next will depend on the growth rate of money supply from one period to the next (but not on the level of the money supply). Thus the stochastic discount factor will be
The "real" value function v should likewise be the nominal value function, divided by the current money stock, and should be written as a function of real prices. Therefore we have
If a …rm's nominal price at time t is P it , then the value of maintaining this price …xed at time t + 1 can be written in nominal or real terms as
Likewise, if for any time t nominal price P it we have the de…nitions
then we can de…ne
Using this de ‡ated notation, we can rewrite the Bellman equation as 3 3 If money growth is uncorrelated, then zt has no e¤ect on the distribution of t+1 , so the aggregate state can be summarized by e t only. But when money growth is correlated we must keep track of t ( e t; zt) instead.
continuously as t changes. This also ensures di¤erentiability almost everywhere: that is, jk t will fail to be di¤erentiable only if d p; a k ; t = exactly at p =
, but generically this does not occur. There is also a second, simpler way of ensuring di¤erentiability for the …xed menu cost case: evaluate it by considering a large, …nite instead of the limiting case = 1. We have veri…ed that this alternative gives quantitatively similar results. Simulations from SDSP model. First line: value V, adjustment gain, and adjustment probability lambda, as functions of real price and productivity shock.
Second line: beginning of period distribution, adjustment distribution, and distribution at time of production, as functions of real price and productivity shock. Third line: adjustment probability as function of the loss from inaction, policy function, and distribution of monthly non-zero price changes. 
